Britain does not simply have an energy price problem.
It has a regulatory problem.
Ofgem’s principal statutory objective is supposed to be protecting the interests of existing and future energy consumers.
But after years of extraordinary bills, supplier failures, energy debt, forced prepayment controversies and households frightened to turn on their heating, we need to ask a basic question:
Has the regulator actually protected consumers?
And there is an equally important question:
Who regulates the regulator?
A regulator that failed to protect consumers
The energy crisis exposed serious weaknesses in Britain’s regulatory system.
The National Audit Office concluded that while Ofgem could not have prevented the global increase in wholesale energy prices, it “did not do enough” in the years beforehand to ensure energy suppliers were financially resilient.
When suppliers subsequently collapsed, consumers ultimately picked up substantial costs through the energy system.
That matters because Ofgem isn’t simply an industry standards body.
Energy is an essential service.
People can choose not to buy a new television. They can postpone replacing their phone.
They cannot realistically choose to stop heating their home, cooking food or using electricity.
When energy regulation fails, therefore, the consequences aren’t simply unhappy customers.
People ration heating.
People accumulate debt.
Businesses struggle with costs.
Vulnerable households can become frightened to use the energy they need.
At that point energy regulation becomes an issue of public welfare.
Who regulates the regulator?
There is another uncomfortable question that deserves considerably more scrutiny.
Look at the professional backgrounds of the people governing Britain’s energy regulator.
Ofgem is governed by the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority, or GEMA. It determines strategy and oversees major regulatory decisions.
Its current membership contains enormous expertise.
But look where some of that expertise comes from.
Ofgem Chair Mark McAllister
Ofgem’s chair, Mark McAllister, spent around four decades working in the energy industry.
His career included executive positions at Monument and LASMO, founding and running North Sea businesses Acorn and Fairfield Energy, and serving as CEO of PA Resources.
He has also chaired the Office for Nuclear Regulation.
That undoubtedly gives him extensive knowledge of the energy industry.
But it also raises a legitimate governance question:
Should the person ultimately chairing Britain’s consumer energy regulator have spent much of their professional career within the industry being regulated?
That isn’t an accusation against Mark McAllister.
It is a question about institutional design.
Former Drax executive on the Ofgem board
Ofgem board member Jonathan Kini previously served as CEO of Drax’s retail businesses, including Opus Energy.
Drax is one of Britain’s significant electricity businesses.
Again, industry experience can be enormously valuable to a regulator.
But consumers are entitled to ask whether a former senior executive from a major participant in Britain’s electricity market should subsequently sit on the governing board of the regulator overseeing that market.
Decades at National Grid
Another Ofgem board member, Nick Winser, has extensive electricity-industry experience.
His career included PowerGen before joining National Grid in 1993, eventually becoming a board-level Group Director responsible for transmission businesses.
He has subsequently held major positions relating to Britain’s electricity infrastructure and energy transition.
Once again, this is valuable expertise.
But put these appointments together and an important pattern begins to emerge.
Britain’s energy regulator possesses enormous amounts of knowledge from inside Britain’s energy system.
The question is whether it possesses an equally powerful perspective from the people paying for it.
Even enforcement raises questions
The issue goes beyond Ofgem’s main board.
Ofgem’s Enforcement Decision Panel exists to make certain enforcement decisions independently on behalf of the regulator.
Its chair, David Ashbourne, is described by Ofgem as a lawyer working for Abu Dhabi National Energy Company PJSC, commonly known as TAQA.
Ofgem’s own biography describes his professional role as Senior Regulatory Lawyer at a major international utility with interests encompassing electricity generation, transmission and distribution alongside oil and gas.
Again, this does not demonstrate misconduct or an improper decision.
But imagine this structure from the perspective of an ordinary consumer.
Should somebody currently working within the international energy industry chair an enforcement panel for Britain’s energy regulator?
Even where conflicts are properly declared and managed, public confidence matters.
This isn’t about accusing individuals
That distinction is important.
There is no basis here for claiming that these people are corrupt or that their previous employment determines the decisions they make.
That isn’t the argument.
The problem is structural.
Energy regulation is extraordinarily technical. Ofgem obviously needs engineers, economists, lawyers and executives who understand how electricity and gas markets actually operate.
But there is a danger when the regulator, consultants, government departments and regulated companies recruit from the same relatively small professional ecosystem.
A regulator can gradually begin to view the system through the industry’s perspective.
That phenomenon is sometimes described as regulatory capture.
It doesn’t require corruption.
It doesn’t require secret meetings.
It doesn’t even require conscious bias.
It can simply happen when the institutions responsible for challenging an industry increasingly share the assumptions, professional networks and worldview of that industry.
That is precisely why independence must be designed into the institution.
Where are the consumers?
Look at Ofgem’s leadership biographies and there is extensive expertise in:
energy markets;
electricity networks;
oil and gas;
economics;
government;
competition policy;
finance;
consultancy;
law;
and corporate management.
All of those skills are useful.
But where is the equivalent representation from people whose careers have principally involved:
fuel poverty?
household debt?
prepayment customers?
disability advocacy?
social housing?
consumer energy campaigning?
small businesses struggling with energy costs?
There are exceptions. Board member Warren Buckley, for example, has chaired National Citizens Advice.
But the wider imbalance deserves examination.
Because if Ofgem’s fundamental purpose is protecting consumers, consumer representation shouldn’t feel like an additional perspective.
It should be at the centre of the institution.
Declaring conflicts isn’t enough
Ofgem publishes a register of interests for its senior leadership.
That is welcome and necessary.
But declaring an interest doesn’t automatically eliminate the wider institutional problem.
The question shouldn’t simply be:
“Has this individual declared their interests?”
It should also be:
“Have we designed a regulator whose leadership collectively has the right incentives, experiences and perspectives?”
Those are different questions.
A regulator could comply perfectly with every conflict-of-interest disclosure rule while still developing an institutional culture too closely aligned with the sector it regulates.
Replace Ofgem
We therefore propose replacing Ofgem in its current form with an Energy Consumer Commission.
Its primary mission should be extraordinarily simple:
Deliver affordable, reliable and transparent energy while protecting consumers from monopoly power and market abuse.
Industry expertise would remain essential.
But the institution would be deliberately designed so that no single industry worldview could dominate it.
Its governing board should include energy engineers, system operators, economists and regulatory specialists alongside consumer advocates, representatives of vulnerable households, small-business representatives and people with direct experience of fuel poverty and household debt.
Close the revolving door
The new regulator should operate under much tougher independence rules.
Senior appointments should face substantial cooling-off periods when moving directly between regulated businesses and senior regulatory positions.
The same principle should apply in reverse.
Senior regulators shouldn’t be making decisions affecting companies one year and accepting lucrative positions with those industries shortly afterwards.
Previous employment, financial interests, consultancy relationships and relevant pension interests should be transparently published.
Recusal requirements should be clear.
Enforcement panels should have particularly stringent independence requirements.
And Parliament should periodically scrutinise whether the regulator’s leadership collectively represents consumers as effectively as it represents technical and industry expertise.
Measure what actually matters
Most importantly, regulatory success should be measurable from the consumer’s perspective.
Every year the regulator should report clearly:
- average household electricity and gas prices;
- average business electricity prices;
- household energy debt;
- numbers of customers using prepayment;
- disconnections and involuntary prepayment interventions;
- network costs and regulated returns;
- supplier margins and financial resilience;
- the proportion of household income spent on essential energy;
- measures of households rationing heating because of cost;
- network reliability and resilience.
These shouldn’t be footnotes buried inside regulatory reports.
They should be the regulator’s scorecard.
If those measures deteriorate substantially, Parliament should demand an explanation.
Government cannot hide behind the regulator
Replacing Ofgem also cannot become an excuse for government to escape responsibility.
Parliament creates the legislation.
Government determines energy policy.
Government decides how subsidies are funded.
Government determines the strategic direction of Britain’s energy system.
A regulator cannot compensate indefinitely for poor political decisions.
The responsibilities therefore need to become much clearer.
Government sets the strategic objectives.
NESO plans and operates the electricity system.
Private companies compete where genuine competition benefits consumers.
Network monopolies operate under strict economic regulation.
And the Energy Consumer Commission stands between those institutions and the people ultimately paying for the system.
Energy consumers need someone unequivocally on their side
Britain has spent decades debating generation technologies.
Gas versus wind.
Nuclear versus renewables.
Public versus private investment.
Net zero versus energy security.
Meanwhile, the person opening the electricity bill has become almost an afterthought.
We want to reverse that relationship.
The energy system exists because homes and businesses need energy.
Consumers do not exist to finance an increasingly complicated energy system.
A regulator therefore shouldn’t judge success principally by whether the energy market functions according to hundreds of pages of regulatory rules.
It should ask a much simpler question:
Is this system delivering affordable, reliable energy for the people who depend upon it?
Ofgem has existed since 2000.
After more than a quarter of a century, Britain should be willing to ask whether the institution designed for the energy market of the early 2000s is still the institution we need today.
Our conclusion is that it isn’t.
Ofgem needs to go.
Not because its employees are the enemy.
Not because industry expertise is undesirable.
But because regulation of an essential service must command extraordinary public trust.
Its independence must be beyond reasonable doubt.
Its incentives must be aligned with consumers.
And its success must ultimately be measured by what happens in people’s homes and businesses.
Because when regulation of an essential service fails, the consequences aren’t confined to spreadsheets and regulatory reports.
They appear in household debt.
They appear in businesses that can no longer compete.
They appear in cold homes.
And ultimately, they can appear in people’s health and lives.
The energy regulator should have one constituency above all others: the people who have no choice but to use energy.
Sources & Evidence
This appendix provides the principal evidence supporting “Ofgem Needs to Go.” Where the article discusses individual members of Ofgem’s leadership, the information is drawn primarily from Ofgem’s own published biographies and registers or other official sources.
The employment history of an individual does not, by itself, demonstrate a conflict of interest, regulatory capture or improper conduct. The argument made in the article concerns the institutional balance, independence and governance of the regulator.
1. Ofgem’s statutory responsibility to consumers
Ofgem states that its principal objective when carrying out its functions is to protect the interests of existing and future electricity and gas consumers.
Source: Ofgem — Our powers and duties
This is important because consumer protection is not simply an aspiration being imposed on Ofgem by critics. It is fundamental to the regulator’s statutory purpose.
2. Ofgem leadership and governance
The Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (GEMA) governs Ofgem. Its membership, executive leadership and biographies are published by Ofgem.
Source: Ofgem — Our board and directors
Ofgem: Our board and directors
This is the primary source for identifying the current leadership of the regulator and their published professional backgrounds.
3. Mark McAllister — Chair of Ofgem
Ofgem’s published material describes Mark McAllister as having approximately four decades of experience in the energy industry.
His career has included executive roles at Monument and LASMO, founding and leading North Sea businesses Acorn and Fairfield Energy and serving as CEO of PA Resources.
He subsequently chaired the Office for Nuclear Regulation before becoming chair of Ofgem.
Sources:
Ofgem: Mark McAllister appointment announcement
UK Government: Mark McAllister appointed Ofgem chair
The article does not argue that this background demonstrates improper conduct. It raises the governance question of whether the leadership of a consumer regulator should contain a different balance between industry experience and direct consumer representation.
4. Jonathan Kini — former Drax retail executive
Ofgem’s biography records Jonathan Kini’s experience in telecommunications, energy and other sectors.
He previously served as CEO of Drax’s retail businesses.
Drax’s own corporate reporting provides additional evidence of his role within the group and its retail operations, including Opus Energy.
Sources:
Ofgem: Our board and directors
This previous employment is relevant to the article’s discussion of the movement of expertise between regulated industries and regulatory institutions.
It does not, by itself, demonstrate a current conflict of interest.
5. Nick Winser — National Grid career
Nick Winser has extensive experience in Britain’s electricity industry.
His career included PowerGen before joining National Grid in 1993. He subsequently held senior positions within National Grid, including responsibility for major transmission operations.
He has since occupied a number of influential roles relating to Britain’s electricity infrastructure and energy transition.
Sources:
Ofgem: Our board and directors
Again, the relevance is not that previous employment at National Grid establishes wrongdoing. It illustrates the considerable representation of established energy-system experience within the regulator’s governance.
6. Ofgem Register of Interests
Ofgem publishes declared interests for members of GEMA and its senior leadership.
This includes outside appointments, relevant financial interests and other relationships which may need to be considered in managing actual or perceived conflicts.
Primary source:
The existence of this register is an important safeguard and should be acknowledged.
However, the article makes a distinction between individual conflict management and the broader question of institutional composition.
A regulator can have effective declarations and recusals while still legitimately being questioned about whether its collective professional background sufficiently represents consumers.
7. Ofgem Enforcement Decision Panel
Ofgem operates an Enforcement Decision Panel to make certain enforcement decisions independently.
Information about its membership and relevant interests is published by Ofgem.
The article highlights the professional background of its chair, David Ashbourne, because Ofgem’s published information identifies his continuing professional involvement with an international energy business.
Sources:
Ofgem: Enforcement Decision Panel
The article does not allege that this has affected any enforcement decision. It asks whether the governance arrangement creates an avoidable perception of conflict for an enforcement body whose independence needs to command public confidence.
8. National Audit Office findings on supplier regulation
The National Audit Office investigated the energy supplier market following the collapse of numerous suppliers during the energy crisis.
Its findings are particularly important because they provide independent scrutiny rather than criticism from an energy company, campaign organisation or political party.
The NAO concluded that Ofgem could not have prevented the increase in wholesale prices but found that:
“Ofgem did not do enough in the years before the unprecedented rise in wholesale prices to ensure the energy supplier sector was resilient.”
The NAO also examined the substantial costs ultimately associated with supplier failures.
Source:
National Audit Office: The energy supplier market
This provides important evidence for the article’s argument that questioning Ofgem’s regulatory performance is not simply ideological criticism.
9. Government support during the energy crisis
The scale of government intervention during the energy crisis demonstrates the economic consequences when energy prices become unaffordable.
The National Audit Office has separately examined the government’s energy bills support schemes and the tens of billions of pounds committed to protecting households and businesses.
Source:
National Audit Office: Energy bills support schemes
This does not establish that Ofgem caused the wholesale energy crisis.
It demonstrates the enormous social and fiscal consequences of energy affordability becoming a national emergency.
10. Vulnerable consumers
Ofgem itself recognises that some consumers are particularly vulnerable to problems within the energy market.
Its Consumer Vulnerability Strategy has specifically considered groups including people with disabilities, health conditions, low incomes and other circumstances that can make energy affordability or access particularly important.
Source:
Ofgem: Consumer Vulnerability Strategy
This supports the article’s argument that energy regulation cannot be assessed in exactly the same way as regulation of an ordinary discretionary consumer market.
What the evidence does — and does not — show
The evidence establishes that:
- Ofgem has a statutory responsibility to protect consumers.
- Independent scrutiny by the National Audit Office has identified significant shortcomings in Ofgem’s regulation of the supplier market before the energy crisis.
- Several members of Ofgem’s governance structure have substantial previous professional experience within the industries or infrastructure sectors connected to the market Ofgem regulates.
- Ofgem itself recognises the importance of declaring and managing interests.
- Britain’s energy crisis resulted in extraordinary intervention by government to protect consumers.
The evidence does not establish that individual Ofgem board members are corrupt, improperly influenced by previous employers or have made decisions for the benefit of former employers.
That is not the allegation being made.
The policy question is broader:
Is declaring individual conflicts sufficient, or should the institutional design of Britain’s energy regulator ensure a substantially stronger consumer voice and greater separation between regulated companies and those appointed to regulate them?
Policy Seed’s position is that reforming individual rules is no longer enough.
Britain should replace Ofgem’s existing institutional model with a consumer-first regulator whose governance, objectives and measures of success begin with the households and businesses paying for Britain’s energy system.